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A Unified Concept of Population Transfer
CHRISTOPHER M. GOEBEL*
Population transfer is an issue arising often in areas of ethnic ten-
sion, from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Western Sahara,
Tibet, Cyprus, and beyond. There are two forms of human population
transfer: removals and settlements. Generally, commentators in interna-
tional law have yet to discuss the two together as a single category of
population transfer. In discussing the prospects for such a broad treat-
ment, this article is a first to compare and contrast international law's
application to removals and settlements.
I. INTRODUCTION
International attention is focusing on uprooted people, especially
where there are tensions of ethnic proportions. The Red Cross spent a
significant proportion of its budget aiding what it called "displaced peo-
ple," removed en masse from their abodes. Ethnic cleansing, a term used
by the Serbs, was a process of population transfer aimed at removing the
non-Serbian population from large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 The
large-scale Jewish settlements into the Israeli-occupied Arab territories
continue to receive publicity. Theoretically speaking, why not take these
and other mass removals or settlements of people, and examine them
under a single category, called population transfer?
Recent discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere, led by
human rights activists, have hinted at such a unified treatment of popula-
tion transfer, in an effort to focus attention on "stateless people" faced
with either removal from an area or settlement into one.3 A conference in
1992 deliberated on situations occurring in what were called "sovereign
* J.D. 1991, Harvard University. Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosk. Ear-
lier draft presented at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization [hereinafter
"UNPO"], Conference on Human Rights Dimension of Population Transfer, Tallinn, Esto-
nia, January 11-13, 1992. The author expresses gratitude for comments on earlier drafts by
Henry Steiner, Michael van Walt van Praag, and John Quigley. Support also came from
Marc Granowitter and Christa Meindersma.
1. International Committee of the Red Cross, statement at the 48th Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Feb. 19, 1992). These operations were in Africa, Latin
America, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, which reflects the broad scope of the problem.
2. Congressional Committee Print, Ethnic Cleaning at 5.
3. Just in the last two years, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter "U.N. Sub-Commission"] has begun to adopt
resolutions covering both forms of movement under the single category of population trans-
fer. See "The Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer Including the Implantation
of Settlers and Settlements," U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1991/21.
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states" (e.g. Poland, claiming to have experienced principally large-scale
removals in the form of expulsions by Hitler and Stalin), as well as coun-
tries "occupied" now or at some point in recent time (e.g. Western Sa-
hara, The Baltics, East Timor and Tibet, by massive settlements princi-
pally, plus removals), "nations without a state" (e.g. Kurdistan,
principally by removals), the lands of "indigenous peoples" (e.g.
Aboriginals of Australia and Chakmas of the Chittagong Hills Tracts, by
settlements and removals) and the lands of "ethnic minorities" (e.g. Al-
banians in Kosova, principally by removals), and others.4 This approach
toward removals would take into account situations ranging from the
more traditionally recognized expulsion of a minority from a country, to
the forced or forcible resettlement of a significant number of indigenous
people for a dam project. Settlements would include those occurring on a
large scale both across U.N.-recognized borders and internally. In any
event population transfer, however defined, should not be confused with
refugee movements' nor normal migration on an individual basis for eco-
nomic reasons.6 For years now, some in the policy-making community
have mingled population transfer's two forms.7 Despite such discussions,
commentators on international law traditionally have not followed suit.'
4. Report of the U.N.P.O. Conference on Human Rights Division of Population Trans-
fer (D. Goldberg, Rapporteur) (published by U.N.P.O., the Hague, 1992) [hereinafter
U.N.P.O. Conference Report].
5. Though when refugee movements are large, such a distinction becomes difficult. Ref-
ugees are defined as moving freely out of their own political motivation. RICHARD PLENDER,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 393 (2d ed. 1988); Resolution on Asylum, 1950, Institute of
International Law at its Bath Session, art. 1, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp., 15 (1951). In contrast,
settlers and removed people in the context of this paper, rather than being motivated by a
personal, individual desire for political asylum, are treated as a group phenomenon whereby
planning and implementation of the movement, and the ultimate motivation, belongs to
governments. It is often difficult to tell whether a refugee moves freely. One difference is
that refugee movement always occurs across international frontiers, whereas population
transfer can also occur within them. Regarding the Kurdish people, the period before the
Second Persian Gulf War saw movements that were population transfer, the removal of
people caused in part by Iraqi government's use of poison gas, see Minority Rights Group,
The Kurds: Massacre by Gas (1989); Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq (Jan.,
1990), whereas flows post-Second Gulf War, involve refugee flows. For example, the
landmark UN Security Council Resolution 688, adopted by the Security Council at its
298nd meeting, addressed refugees. U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
6. Regarding migration, see generally PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW, supra
note 5. See also Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration (Dec. 5-6,
1991) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on the Impact of International
Migration on the Security and Stability of States, Center for International Studies, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology) (differentiates between normal migration and population
movement with substantial government involvement).
7. See, e.g., T. Scudder & E. Colson, From Welfare to Development: A Conceptual
Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People, in INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION AND RESET-
TLEMENT 267 (1982).
8. Existing literature such as Israel Shahak, A History of the Concept of 'Transfer' in
Zionism, 18 J. PALESTINE STUD. 22, n.3 (1989), and Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law
and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT'L L. REV. 207 (1975) [hereinafter Law and
Transfers], treats population transfer as principally the removal of people, whereas other
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Besides a handful of scholars, including those recognized herein, few have
published lately on a form of population transfer. A unique aspect of this
paper is that, while examining a broad conception of transfer, it does
compare removals and settlements under applicable international law
from World War II onward. Indeed, to some extent population transfers
must be examined on a case-by-case basis; rather than doing so, this pa-
per serves as an overview of issues.
In the context of this paper, as a basic rule, transfers of both sorts
are meant to have in common the element of moving a large numbers of
people, in relative rather than absolute terms,9 and state involvement or
acquiescence in the movement. The specific people involved can be cate-
gorized as either removed people or settlers, and in the latter case original
inhabitants of the area receiving settlers. From there, analysis becomes
more difficult. Forced removals, in specific circumstances, have been ad-
judged crimes against humanity. Settlements as well as removals, under
certain restrictions, have violated doctrines of humanitarian law. Discrep-
ancies exist between the two types of transfer, along such doctrinal lines,
but also whether the element of consent is a criteria proper to population
transfer.'0 The extent to which those differences resolve themselves and
the two types of transfer collapse into a broad, yet coherent category of
treatment will depend on the future development of international law to-
wards, not only the practices themselves, but their effects on all those
affected by population transfer.
II. THE PRACTICE OF POPULATION TRANSFER
A. Population Transfer as a Crime Against Humanity and Possible
Extensions
The mass removal of citizens across internationally recognized bor-
ders of a state, is called mass deportations or expulsions. Transfers, such
as those at the hands of Nazi Germany, violate the Nuremberg principles
and constitute war crimes or any crimes against humanity in times of
writings touch on "settlements" as an isolated phenonmenon as compared with removals.
See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories
Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990).
9. Cf. U.N.P.O. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 7 ("Should numbers be part of
the definition, or should the definition focus on the rational and intention involved in the
transfer?"). The Report proposed a unified definition of "population transfer": "the move-
ment of large numbers of people, either into or away from a certain territory, with state
involvement or acquiescence of government and without the free and informed consent of
the people being moved or the people into whose territory they are being moved." Id. (em-
phasis added). That definition turns on the element of consent. Also, it raises the issue of
territorial definition, treated herein.
10. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[cJoncerned that the movement of people is often
achieved either without free and informed consent of those people being moved or without
the consent of those people into whose territory they are being moved." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1990/17, supra note 3. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3.
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international', and, it has been argued, civil war."
The expulsion of masses of non-Serbs from eastern Croatia across
front lines, by bus and other methods, was accomplished through coer-
cion, including threats, violence and discrimination.' 3 Similarly, in Bos-
nia, the deportation or mass displacement of people in order to create
ethnically pure areas was an important strategy to Serbia.' 4 These expul-
sions contributed to a substantial number of the masses of non-Serbs who
exited Bosnia.' 5 Occurring during international war, these expulsions
could surely be adjudged crimes against humanity. Had they occurred
earlier, before the international community reconized the independence
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation would have been
deemed civil war with the front lines inside national boundaries.'" The
coercive tactics of "ethnic purification' '1 7 allegedly used by the militia
would not change with the varying classification of the war. It would be
arbitrary to use crimes against humanity to draw a strong distinction be-
tween international and civil war.
As seen through the nature of the above examples, the treatment,
under international law, of removals of people depends on whether the
transfer occurred during belligerency. Yet, out of belligerency and into
peacetime, mass expulsions across borders of citizens,' or aliens who were
in the originating territory lawfully such as Asians from Uganda,' 9 are
11. Agreement for the Prosecutioni and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 39 AM. J. INT'L. L., Supp. 257, 260 (1945), arts. 6(b)-(c)
Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter "Major War Criminal Agreement"]; Nuremberg Indictment, Count
3, §§ B, J; See Alfred M. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L., 234,
235-36 [hereinafter De Zayas, Forced Resettlement]; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21,
supra note 3. This should be distinguished from deportations on an individual basis.
Lapidoth, Expulsion of Civilians from Areas under Israeli Control in 1967, 2 EUR. J. INT'L
L., No. 1, 97, 102-04 (1991) (it is inconclusive whether deportation of individuals, as opposed
to en masse, has been prohibited under customary international law). U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution 95 (1) of December 11, 1946, gave expression to the general applicability of
the Nuremberg principles. 20PPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-19 (7th ed., 1952). But see
J. STONE, No PEACE No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17 (1969).
12. Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221.
13. See Human Rights Watch, War Crimes and Bosnia-Herzegovina, at 75-81.
14. See id. at 71. See also John F. Burns, Bosnian Strife Cuts Old Bridges of Trust,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at A-8 (noting that although forced deportations have also been
carried out by Muslim Slavs against Serbians, the process appears to have been more sys-
tematic on the part of the Serbs).
15. Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 199. (categorizing as an international
armed conflict involving two states, Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
16. For an analysis of the conflict in former Yugoslavia as a civil war, see generally,
Charles Lewis Nier, III, Note, The Yugoslavia Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability
of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflict in the Modern World, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 303 (1992).
17. Burns, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Protocol 4, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, came into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
19. See Richard Plender, The Ugandan Crisis and the Right of Expulsion Under In-
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circumscribed closely by human rights law. 0 This is due to any presence
of discriminatory or racist characteristics in the expulsions.
2 '
Of course, not all governments undertaking removals across interna-
tional borders lack concern for those being removed. Some are motivated
by the desire as a sovereign to "save" a threatened minority abroad by
"inviting" it into its territory. An example has been where an element of
exchange is involved, like the 1922-23 swap of Greeks and Turks.22 In
such cases, despite any state benevolency, jurists have focused on more
than just the attitude of the state. The perspective of the transferees
counts, too. The Institut de Droit International, in its 1952 session, ex-
pressed concern for those being removed, especially as to whether their
movement is voluntary.
23
The argument has been forwarded that crimes against humanity
should apply to the removal of people outside of armed conflict that
starts and finishes within the territory of a state. It relies on the analogy
to apartheid in South Africa. 24 Relocation of millions of blacks to artifi-
cially created homelands in the land-locked interior of the country, an
effort by zonation programs of the development branch of the govern-
ment, met sufficient international condemnation to be considered cen-
sured under customary international law. Part of the government's action
in transferring the people was racism and discrimination. Yet, other mas-
sive removals within borders, such as have occurred in Guatemala,25 East
ternational Law, 9 INT'L COMM. JURISTS, REV. 19, 27-30 (1972).
20. See PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW, supra note 5, at 474 n.174, 477; R.C.
Chhangani, Notes and Comments, Expulsion of Uganda Asians and International Law, 12
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400, 402, 405-07 (1972); Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 244-45.
21. According to the U.N. Sub-Commission, "the practice of population transfer [refer-
ring to both removals and settlements] is discriminatory in its application and . . . inher-
ently leads to widespread and systematic discrimination." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21,
supra note 3.
22. See Alfred M. De Zayas, A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expulsions,
REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 17-20 (A. Bramwell, ed., 1988)[hereinafter De
Zayas, Historical Survey].
23. 44 Annuaire 138 (1952) (Sienna Session of 1952). See also PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW, supra note 5, at 474. During the Nuremberg trials, it was recognized that
the government's motive for transfer could go beyond ill-treatment of those transferred. An
individual could escape liability if he was motivated by military necessity. De Zayas, Forced
Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Writing about removals, De Zayas says, "most transfers
of population are not likely to be voluntary." Alfred M. De Zayas, The Legality of Mass
Population Transfers: The German Experience 1945-48, 12 E. EUR. Q. 1, 6 (1978)[hereinaf-
ter German Experience].
24. German Experience, supra note 23, at 253; De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra
note 11, at 236. But see Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 104 (drafters of the Nuremberg Charter
may have considered mass deportations for forced labor and extermination).
25. See Philip, The Maya of Guatemala (Minority Rights Group Report No. 62, 1989);
Counterinsurgency and the Development Pole Strategy in Guatemala, 12 CULTURAL SUR-
VIVAL Q. 3 (1988); The Indians of Guatemala: Problems and Prospects for Social and Eco-
nomic Reconstruction (Cultural Survival, Fall, 1987); Witness to Genocide (Survival Inter-
national, 1983); Guatemalan Refugees Now Threatened by Relocation (Survival
International Urgent Action Bulletin, 1984).
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Timor, 26 Australia,27 Brazil,2" Egypt, Argentina and Paraguay, 29 have not
met with the same degree of international disapproval. At least in the last
five instances, relatively without belligerency in the sense of armed con-
flict, some deference may have been given to governments' motivation for
development. 30 Still, if, as in South Africa, the effect on those being
moved rises to the level of systematic racial discrimination, any large
scale population transfer may violate customary international law.
3 1
At least one international body has treated removal within borders
with disapproval. The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops in 1974 re-
sulted in the widespread eviction and population transfer of over 170,000
Greek Cypriots from their homes in the northern part of Cyprus. In Cy-
prus v. Turkey, the European Commission on Human Rights discussed
population transfer "The Commission . . .considers that the transporta-
tion of Greek Cypriots to other places, in particular the forcible excur-
sions within the territory controlled by the Turkish army, and the depor-
tation of Greek Cypriots ... constitute an interference with their private
life." 2 The Commission thus linked a form of population transfer, the
removal of people, to the right to private life. This right is related to the
right to security of persons. Because the Commission saw forced transpor-
26. See JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIG-
ENOUS PEOPLES 142 (1987); F. HIORTH, TIMOR PAST AND PRESENT 61 (1985); Steven Erlanger,
East Timor, Reopened by Indonesia, Remains a Sad and Terrifying Place, N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1990, at 18.
27. See Minority Rights Group, Aboriginal Australians, Report No. 35 (1988)(in
Queensland, mining policies effectively destroyed some of the economic and social basis of
Aboriginal traditional lifestyle and involved large-scale removals).
28. See Minority Rights Group, What Future for the Amerindians of South America,
Report No. 15 (1977). The Sobradinho Dam project resettled about 60,000 urban and rural
people. Michael Cerna, Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects (World Bank
Technical Paper No. 80, 1988).
29. See Cerna, supra note 28. In Egypt dam projects have removed and resettled at
least 170,000 people; in the border between Argentina and Paraguay, submersion projects
have removed some 45,000. Id.
30. If there is sufficient public interest for the transfer and proper compensation to-
wards those being moved, these factors should play into the determination of the transfer's
permissibility. Claire Palley, Population Transfer and International Law 3 (draft paper
presented at the UNPO Conference).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS]:
"A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or
condones (a) genocide... (f) systematic racial discrimination,. . or (g) a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Accord Barcelona Traction,
Light & Power Co., Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32. See also International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 5(d)(i),(ii), 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter "Discrimination Convention"], which prohibits racial discrimination within
the borders of a state, occurring in conjunction with limitations on freedom of movement
and residence; Palley, supra note 30, at 4. See infra note 88 for further discussion of free-
dom of movement.
32. Cyprus v. Turkey, Cases 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 72-74




tation as an infringement of the right to private life, the case sets a prece-
dent regarding the use of force to transfer populations, Thus, emphasiz-
ing voluntariness.
Most importantly, in terms of any division between transfers across
borders and those only within, the language in Cyprus v. Turkey distin-
guished between removal within the boundaries of the territory controlled
by the Turkish army, and forced removals across borders. The Commis-
sion condemned both transfers. This invites greater scrutiny towards re-
movals occurring, like in northern Cyprus, under some belligerent condi-
tions, such as military occupation, even though only within state borders.
In brief conclusion about removals: Belligerency has been present in
situations highly condemned under international law, though this con-
straint is reduced by the presence of systematic racial discrimination, as
in Uganda or South Africa. Voluntariness is an important issue to remov-
als. In order to invoke crimes against humanity, the blatant lack of volun-
tariness in the victims of World War-II era transfers is key. Furthermore,
the issue of voluntariness has some importance regardless of the state's
intention.
B. Population Transfer Under Humanitarian Law
The Baltic States, Cyprus, East Timor, the West Bank, Tibet, the
Western Sahara, and Eritrea have been or are locations of the other form
of population transfer: settlements.3" These movements, unlike some ex-
pulsions, have never been formally adjudged crimes against humanity.
Because these situations have been sites of military occupations, the set-
tlements of the occupants' people has raised the issue of humanitarian
law, the part of international law which emphasizes the protection of the
individual not only during and following belligerency, but, according to
some scholars, also during peacetime occupations. 4
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War presents one of the clearest ex-
amples of positive international law governing population transfer. It
states:
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies .... Individual or
mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited regardless
of their motive. 5
33. Palley, supra note 30, at 5. For the only situations not documented elsewhere in
this article, see Minority Rights Group, Eritrea and Tigray, Report No. 5, at 4-14 (1983);
International Federation for the Protection of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Mi-
norities, Comm. H.R., 43rd Sess., Agenda item 8, 1991.
34. See infra note 53.
35. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
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Furthermore, the Geneva Convention may outlaw population transfers
into occupied lands, not only during hostilities but afterwards until a final
political settlement has been reached in those lands. 6 Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention states that the Geneva Convention applies to "armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of
self determination as enshrined by the Charter of the United Nations,"3 7
and contains language similar to article 49.
These provisions dictate that, but for certain specific exceptions, set-
tlements in an occupied territory contravene international law. While
forced or forcible movement is illegal under these codes,3" an important
issue is that of voluntary movement. On the one hand, the voluntary na-
ture of an act should not be interpreted to legalize what would otherwise
be considered a violation of an international standard;39 especially if the
movement involves the purposes and effects, on both those transferred
and original inhabitants, that the Geneva Convention was crafted to pre-
vent.4 0 On the other hand, there are legal difficulties inherent in defining
"voluntary." In this regard, it should be pointed out that most settle-
ments, if not forced, are facilitated by government actions. Once such tool
is incentives, like increased industrialization in the area targeted for
transfer as occurred in Soviet-occupied Estonia and Latvia.4 1 Even if vol-
untary settlement on an individual basis were permissible under article
49, the settlement programs of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the ambi-
tious ones like those of the Indonesian 4' and Chinese43 governments, must
Geneva Convention].
36. See id. arts. 1, 2, 4, 17, 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3518, 3520, 3530, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at
287, 288, 290, 300, 318.
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 1,
para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
38. Cf. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236 (regarding the other form
of transfer, removals: "The clear prohibition of forced resettlement in time of war has been
codified.")
39. The UN Sub-Commission has recognized the link between the right to security of
persons and the issue of population transfer, broadly defined. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1990/L.60, supra note 3; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/28, supra note 3. In other contexts
involving that right, the consent of an individual does not legitimize violations of an inter-
national norm. See Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 115, 120-124 (Theodore Meron ed. 1984) (explaining the right to
life norm).
40. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
41. See Romauld J. Misiunas, The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sov-
ereignty, in THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY 214 (Lubomyr
Hajda & Mark Bessinger eds. 1990). See also V. PURINA & J. JANSEVICS, LATVIJAS PSR
SOCIALISTISTIKA DARBA DALISANAS SISTEMA [THE SOCIALISTIC DIVISION OF LABOR SYSTEM IN
THE LATVIAN S.S.R.] 48 (1978); U.N. GAOR, Comm. H.R., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 12,
(1992) (Statement of the Estonian Delegation, Feb. 26, 1992). Cf. GEOFFREY A. HOSKING,
THE FIRST SOCIALIST SOCIETY: A HIS'TORY FROM WITHIN 399 (1st ed. 1985).
42. See generally MARIEL O'rTEN, TRANSMIGRASI: MYTHES AND REALITIES, INDONESIAN
RESETTLEMENT POLICY, 1965-1986 (1986).
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be examined to determine whether they meet the criteria of "voluntary"
settlements on an individual basis.
In the case of settlements, these difficulties about voluntariness lead,
to the question of whether consent should be relevant at all to a broad
concept of population transfer. Yet, in the instance of removals, volunta-
riness is of paramount concern. Comparing these to settlements, the dif-
ferent weight put on voluntariness will have to be reconciled for the two
categories of transfers to be collapsed satisfactorily into a single category
for legal treatment.
Just as national security might motivate governments to remove mi-
norities through expulsion,"" civilian settlements across the internation-
ally recognized borders of a state are sometimes claimed to be necessary
for the security of the transferring power and, therefore, essential to that
power in order to preserve public order and safety.45 For example, control
of the regions at the borders of Indonesian-dominated lands has been said
to have an explicit strategic objective that depends on settlements.'
In the Israeli Supreme Court's most important decision on popula-
tion transfer, Beth-El,'47 Justice Witkon sustained a prior opinion that the
fact that requisitioned lands are intended for Jewish civilian settlements
does not deprive such requisitioning of its security character. 4' In addi-
tion, although no terrorist activity actually took place, Justice Witkon re-
fused to distinguish the present case from one in which it had occurred.' 9
Those stances, regarding control of border regions, have in common the
use of civilians to gain control of other civilians, i.e. original inhabitants
and their areas. Even if population transfer were intended for national
security purposes, settlements can cause conflicts among people that set-
43. See HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES & THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, THE
LONG MARCH: CHINESE SETTLERS AND CHINESE POLICIES IN EASTERN TIBET 5-9 (1991) [here-
inafter Tibet Report]; ASIA WATCH, MERCILESS REPRESSION: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TIBET
15 (1990); Sechin Jagchid, Discrimination Against Minorities in China, in HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE STUDIES 389, 401-02 (Willem A. Veenhoven, ed. 1975); 134 Cong. Rec. 15,500, 15,501-02
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) (China trip report by Sen. Leahy); Note, Human Rights in Tibet:
An Emerging Foreign Policy Issue, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 193 (1992)(China has been at-
tempting since 1983 to dilute the Tibetan identity by transferring numerous Han Chinese
into Tibet). While the note adds in a footnote 25 that "[wihether the Chinese are intention-
ally transferring Han into Tibet is a matter of complex debate," id. at 196. See infra, text
accompanying notes 115 and 119 for other issues on the transfer that are important.
44. See DeZayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236.
45. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
46. Budiardjo, The Politics of Transmigration, 16 THE ECOLOGIST No. 2/3, at 111 (1986)
(as related in 1985 by the then Indonesian transmigration [i.e., resettlement] minister).
47. H.C. 606/78, Ayub v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PISKEI DIN 113 summarized in 9
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979) [hereinafter Beth-El].
48. Id. at 340.
49. Id. at 339. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 186 (1957). Cf. H.C.
302/72 Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. Israel 27(2) PISKEM DIN 169 summarized in 5 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) (Court unanimously upheld arguments that steps taken were neces-
sary due to the terrorist activities and acts of sabotage which in fact took place in the area).
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tlements may only exacerbate security problems.50
The issue of control over civilians points to the viewpoint of original
inhabitants. Though voluntariness or consent from the settlers' perspec-
tive is a confused, inconclusive subject, it might gain significance, as fur-
ther explained below, 1 regarding how others are affected by the
settlements.
National security arguments may lead to attempts to suspend human
rights. Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights52 permits states in urgent circumstances to suspend or breach the
right to liberty and security of the person, a right which may be affected
by population transfer. Such derogation, however, has little relevance, if
any, when settlements are undertaken by a government in order to
change the demographic structure or the political, cultural, religious and
other characteristics of the original inhabitants in the receiving area.53
The permanent nature of such changes means that population transfer
should never be justified on temporary grounds necessary for derogation.
This is true where transfer occurs during prolonged occupations. Pro-
longed occupations have received some attention as a distinct category,
having the characteristic of "belligerency ending. ' 5 4 The main conven-
tions relating to military occupations, including the Geneva Convention
and 1907 Hague Regulations 5 provide no meaningful variation in the
rules because of the length of an occupation 6 and, indeed, may cover not
50. See generally Marcus Colchester, The Social Dimensions of Government Sponsored
Migration and Involuntary Resettlement: Policies and Practice, (1986) (unpublished manu-
script prepared for the Independent Commission on Inter-national Humanitarian Issues in
Geneva)(available through author of present article). In the context of the occupied Arab
territories, Roberts and, Falk & Weston, lend support for two points: first, settlements are
almost never necessary for genuine military or security purposes and do not, in fact, serve
any such purpose; second, even if justified for military needs, the transfer still constitutes a
violation of rules of international law. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 84; Richard A. Falk &
Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West
Bank and Gaza: in Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L. J. 129, 147-48 (1991). Cf.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 107.
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(1), adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 [hereinafter Political Covenant].
53. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[d]isturbed by reports concerning the implantation
of settlers and settlements in certain countries, including particular occupied territories,
with the aim to changing the demographic structure and the political, cultural, religious,
and other characteristics of the countries concerned." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17,
supra note 3; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3. Derogation, generally,
is "extremely troublesome from the human rights viewpoint." Lillich, supra note 39, at 120.
54. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 51-53. Cf. Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
55. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed Reg-
ulations, signed Oct. 18, 1907, § 3, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 CONSOL. T.S. 277, 295-97 [hereinafter
Hague Regulations].
56. The exception is the "one year after" provision of article 6, paragraph 3 of the
Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention, supra note 35, art. 6, para. 3, at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 292. However, this provision is of little importance. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 55-56;
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only belligerent occupations but, also situations in which the belligerency
has subsided.5 7 Moreover, in peacetime the rights of the occupant dimin-
ish markedly as compared with those of a belligerent occupation. Where
population transfer extends from belligerent to prolonged occupation and
then into peacetime, the occupier may assert relatively fewer rights. That,
again, brings into doubt the "temporariness" justification mentioned
above.
Yet Justice Landau, concurring in Beth-El, supported the Israeli set-
tlements against this obvious doubt, saying that the hope that a political
solution someday will be reached justifies population transfer.59 Regard-
ing any particular occupation, Israeli or otherwise, even if one were satis-
fied that the Hague Regulations, and not the Geneva Convention, were in
effect,"0 article 43 of the Hague Regulations limits the freedom of the oc-
cupier to undertake population transfer, especially in extended or peace-
time occupation." Though many of the above cited sources have devel-
oped around the occupied Arab territories, it bears mentioning that the
Chinese and Indonesian governments see Tibet and East Timor, respec-
tively, as important military zones.62 Even if these were legitimate gov-
ernmental interests related to national security during peacetime, the
governments would not automatically gain free discretion to undertake
population transfer.
Should conventional law, including the relatively lenient Hague Reg-
ulations, be applicable, that discretion must include reference to the hu-
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELA-
TIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN THE TIME OF WAR 22 (Jean S. Pictet ed.
1958); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 57, 59 (1982).
57. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 52; Adam Roberts, What is Military Occupation?, 55
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 249, 253 (1984). But see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL
STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 43 (1987). "[T]here are, in fact, so many situa-
tions in which the applicability of the Geneva Conventions .. .has been denied that the
common practice has been rejection of the law, rather than its formal recognition and imple-
mentation." Id.
58. C. Lleewellyn Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace, 9
GROTIUS Soc'y TRANSACTIONS 149, 159-60 (1923). See also Roberts, supra note 57, at 273-79.
Where military necessity exists, an occupying government has "considerable discretion."
Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 138. But military necessity generally ends when belliger-
ency stops.
59. Beth-El, supra note 47, at 392.
60. See Yoram Dinstein, The Judgment in the Matter of Pitchat Rafiah, 3 TEL AViV
UNIV. L. REV. 934 (Hebrew, 1973).
61. See Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142 (a duty is imposed upon the occupant
vis-a-vis the original inhabitants). Cf. H.C. 337/71, Christian Society for the Holy Places v.
Minister of Defense, 26(1) PISKEI DIN 574, summarized in 2 ISR. Y. B. HUM. RTs. 354, 355
(1972).
62. Regarding East Timor, see BURGER, supra note 26, at 142-43; Budiardjo,-supra note
46, at 111; See Generally FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSON, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 378-83 (1990). Concerning Tibet, see TiET REPORT,
supra note 43, at 2-4; What McMahon Wrought, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1987, at 59.
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manitarian concerns of all individuals affected by population transfer."
The needs of both the settlers and original inhabitants who are affected
become particularly relevant as an occupation moves through the stages,
from belligerent, to prolonged, and into peacetime.
If prolonged and even peacetime occupations are reasons for continu-
ing prohibition of settlements, that is a sign that the positive law prohib-
iting settlements is moving away from any necessity for belligerency."
This may be compared to cases of removals, where any presence of racism
and discrimination may be pushing any prohibition, based on either posi-
tive or normative law, away from the need for belligerency.
C. Population Transfer Under Principles Regarding Colonialism
The practice of population transfer is also part and parcel of coloni-
alism. One case of population transfer into territory that has been "colo-
nized", according to the formal U.N. regime, is the Western Sahara. 5 The
Moroccan takeover of this area was marked by clear tactics including the
settlement of over 200,000 Moroccans as well as removal by "brutal tac-
tics" of some groups of original inhabitants in the area."' The Western
Sahara situation was before the International Court of Justice." The con-
nection of population transfer to colonialism is patently clear. Condemna-
tions of colonialism came from the ICJ," and subsequently the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly 9  and noted experts. 0  In situations of traditional
63. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human
Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 111-12 (1978); Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
64. The literature on prolonged occupations has not addressed population transfer in
its other forms.
65. See generally VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, THE WESTERN SAHARANS:
BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT (1980); DAVID LYNN PRICE, THE WESTERN SAHARA (The Washing-
ton Papers, vol. 7, no. 63 1979).
66. CLAUDE BONTEMS, LA GUERRA DU SAHARA OCCIDENTAL [THE WAR OF THE WESTERN
SAHARA] 72 (1984). See also JOHN DAMIS, CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN
SAHARA DISPUTE 61-69 (1983). Although the brutality of Moroccan forces is well known and
documented, it should be noted that not all of the population movement was forced by the
Moroccans. Some of it was encouraged by the Polisario Front, a pro-independence move-
ment, in face of the invasion. Id. at 72.
67. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 65,
at 167.
68. The ICJ declined to declare the Western Sahara "terra nullius" but also failed to
declare the territory Moroccan or Mauritaurian. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at para. 162.
The Western Sahara case does not discuss population transfer directly, the opinion is im-
portant nonetheless for the connection it makes between self-determination and colonialism.
See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at para. 162; See also Self-Determination: The Cases of
Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Western Sahara, 82 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 429, 439-42,
(Michael P. Malloy, ed. 1988). From this connection it is arguable that population transfer
effects the right to self-determination. See Id. at 443 (discussing this possible effect). But
see DAMIS, supra note 66, at 60 (positing that the Court's decision was essentially political).
69. See DAMIS, supra note 66, at 94, citing U.N. Doc. A/35/595 (1980), also referring to
the right of the Sahrawi population to self-determination.
70. See, e.g., The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of United Nations Res-
olutions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, para. 69 (1980).
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colonialism, a nexus has been established between the use of force and its
effect on a people's identity."1 As a reuslt, the U.N. acted.
D. Some Limits on Jurisprudence and Positive Law
Western Sahara and its aftermath may be contrasted with situations
of indigenous groups, such as the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hills
Tracts, or various sparsely inhabited Amazonian provinces of Bolivia,
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. These face what most
consider to be settlements by ethnically distinct, dominating groups en-
couraged or even forced by U.N. recognized governments. 72 The above-
mentioned nexus between force and peoples' identity may exist even in
these situations of transfer.7 In contrast to the Western Sahara and other
situations of traditional colonialism, however, these settlements have oc-
curred within the governments' U.N. recognized borders. At issue is the
possible constraint of article 2.7 of the U.N. Charter, which states that
"[niothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State. ' 4 Like situations of removals solely within do-
mestic frontiers,7 5 the concurrent presence, of systematic discrimination,
genocide, 76 or gross and persistent violations of human rights77 counte-
nances article 2.7. So does the moral pressure of publicists like Theodoro-
poulos who recognizes colonialism outside the traditional U.N. definition.
He asserts that South Africa is the chief paradigm of "settler colonial-
71. The U.N. General Assembly, in the context of colonialism, noted that "the use of
force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable
rights and of the principles of non-intervention." Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/5217, Supp. No. 28, at 121
(1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. The prohibition on the use of force
is also now a rule of customary international law. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., at 98-101.
72. See Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
649, 668 n.71 (1988) (approximately 300,000 Bengalis were settled in the Tracts from 1978-
88); Written statement submitted by The Nordic Saamic Council et al. at the U.N. Sub-
Comm., 43rd Sess. Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/NGO/3. Colchester, supra note
50, at 12 (regarding the other regions)
73. See Hannum, supra note 72, at 668; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3.
74. U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (1969). The U.N. Sub-
Commission has not limited its concern to settlements occurring across international fron-
tiers. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21,
supra note 3.
75. See, e.g., supra, text accompanying note 24 (example of South Africa).
76. See discussion infra III.B.2.
77. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702. U.N. resolutions di-
rectly or indirectly authorize the U.N. Sub-Commission to undertake studies or working
groups to address consistent patterns of extreme human rights violations, even though they
occur within the borders of a given state. Admittedly, international bodies today do not
emphasize de-colonization. For example, the U.N. did not oppose apartheid under the pre-
text of decolonization. Therefore, any law on settlements within domestic frontiers will de-
velop apart from traditional colonialism.
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ism. ''7 8 The South African government undertook removals, through zo-
nation, in order to clear the way for accomplishment of the other form of
population transfer: settlements.7 '9 These started as well as finished
within the boundaries of that state.
For settlements as well as removals occurring in such territorial lim-
its, prohibition would be more meaningful if the prohibition came from
positive law in a rule explicitly about transfer. Then they would be less
sensitive to issues defining territory. The following issues point to the
conclusion, based on a limited analysis, that removals within interna-
tional frontiers are closer to benefitting from concrete law, such as the
Geneva Convention and doctrines on crimes against humanity, than are
settlements.
The only positive law directly prohibiting settlements comes from
the Geneva Convention. The definition of territory covered by the laws is
crucial. Whether an occupation is belligerent or peaceful, the territory
must be under some form of occupation."s It is true that Protocol I, also
addressing transfers, applies beyond situations of military occupation, 1
but its language prohibiting transfer still refers strictly to transfer into or
out of areas under occupation. These two instruments also refer to remov-
als, which are somewhat constrained by the need for occupation.8 2 Re-
movals, unlike settlements, have fallen subject to crimes against human-
ity. Related commentary shows that, in general, prohibitions on removals
may be less constrained by the very idea of territorial definition. For ex-
ample, there is the view espoused by some scholars, such as Palley, that it
was just as "unlawful" for the Allies after World War II to deport
Germans en masse as it was for the Germans to do so to others during
that War.8 3 Upon further examination such a view may implicate, e.g., the
deportation of Germans from Sudetenland, even though this area was not
78. C. THEODOROPOULOS, COLONIALISM AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPO-
RARY THEORY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 65 (1988). Theodoro-
poulos writes of "settler colonialism," calling it "colonialism" where restrictions are "im-
posed on a colonial people by a colonial power existing geographically not apart from its
colony but instead within the colonial territory." Id. Cf. A. JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 18
(1986) (Whether a state enjoys exclusive power over a territory is not a precise criteria for
determining what constitutes a colonial territory). Today, the U.N. does not emphasize de-
colonization; for example, de-colonization was not the pretext for U.N. efforts against
apartheid.
79. Colchester, supra note 50, at 20.
80. Unlike removals, massive and permanent settlements across borders of states, ex-
cluding repatriation of refugees, are a policy implemented uniquely into areas experiencing
prolonged occupations. Settlements, as defined in this paper, almost never occur anymore
from one sovereign state to another. See Hucker, Migration and Resettlement Under Inter-
national Law, in The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare 338-9 (R. MacDon-
ald et. al. eds. 1978).
81. See supra text accompanying note 35. Note, few states have ratified.
82. See Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 98-99.
83. Palley, supra note 30, at 17. See generally De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note
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technically "occupied" by the responsible transferors. 4 Furthermore,
there is the argument, buttressed by the analogy to the situation in ex-
Yugoslavia, that crimes against humanity also apply to removals during
civil war within international frontiers.8 5
Referring to these last such removals, more authoritatively than the
opinion of scholars, is the Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conven-
tion, which applies to armed conflicts with or without an international
character. 8 Protocol II restricts population transfer, through article 17 in
the form of removals but not settlements. This exclusivity further sup-
ports the above comparison.8 7 The comparison is reinforced by reference
to international deliberations. Turkey v. Cyprus condemned removals
that, while occurring in an area technically under occupation, started and
ended there.88 By contrast, settlements starting and ending within a terri-
tory under occupation have not fallen subject to comparable concerted
deliberations. Thus as the above analysis-though limited in
scope-indicates, there may be some imbalance in a comparison of ex-
isting law about the two sorts of transfers when they occur within fron-
tiers. Any imbalance may be overcome by future developments in inter-
national law towards dealing with the effects of population transfer.
III. THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION TRANSFER
Along with the actual movement of people, an adequate recognition
of the effects of population transfer is important, even though these ef-
fects may be less detectable than the movement itself.8 Discrepancies
under international law may exist between the two forms of population
transfer, for example the question of territorial status. If the effects of
any population transfer rise to the level of gross and consistent violations
of international human rights, that may be a violation of customary inter-
84. Also regarding state practices, the definition of a territory as "occupied" is key for
settlements.
85. De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221. See supra note 13 and accom-
panying text.
86. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977) [hereinafter Proto-
col Ill. Protocol II supplements Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which applies "in the
case of armed conflict not of an international character," by extending it to inter-state con-
flicts where signatories are capable of carrying out "sustained and concerted military opera-
tions." Id. at art. 1.
87. Article 17 reads: "The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand." See International Committee of the Red Cross, statement at
the 48th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, at 3, Feb. 1992.
88. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
89. The fact that "[p]eople and socio-cultural systems respond to forced relocation in
predictable ways," Scudder & Colson, supra note 7, at 267, suggests some hope for the es-
tablishment of international norms recognizing any costly and disruptive results from popu-
lation transfer.
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national law, though not necessarily codified per se to refer directly to
population transfer.
A. Effects on Those Being Moved: Freedom of Movement and Other
Rights
In modern times, the most significant limitations on a state's right to
control the movement of people is based not on principles of economic
interdependence, but on rules designed to protect human rights. 90 Article
13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
The right to freedom of movement, an essential part of the right to
personal liberty,"' is most likely part of customary international law.93
Emphasis of that status is the inclusion of freedom of movement in the
Discrimination Convention.94 Yet, despite any special status for freedom
of movement, international law has yet to prescribe a satisfactory frame-
work for movement involved in modern population transfer.
As the issue of voluntariness is more complicated in cases of settle-
ments than removals, so goes freedom of movement. The Universal Dec-
laration, article 13, refers to movement both within and across a state's
internationally recognized borders. 95 Settlers moving across borders un-
questionably have the right to leave their country. That raises a threshold
question: are settlers freely leaving their country? A government will
have varying levels of participation in population transfer: it will sponsor
90. PLENDER, supra note 5, at 62.
91. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)[hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
92. Lillich, supra note 39, at 189; cf. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/1990/17, supra note 3;
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3 (freedom of movement and security of per-
sons in conjunction with population transfer).
93. Rapporteur's Report by Fausto Pocar, Vice-Chairman of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, at the European Workshop on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Past-
Present-Future, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/89/1, at 101 (1988); Daniel Turack, A Brief Review of
the Provisions in Recent Agreements Concerning Freedom of Movement Issues in the Mod-
ern World, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-96 (Winter 1979); cf. Lillich, supra note 39, at
151 (rights to transnational movement "seem well-established in conventional and perhaps
even customary international human rights law"). But see id. for the position that the right
to internal movement, distinct from movement across borders, is not part of customary in-
ternational law. Lillich's reasoning, however, is based on the weak evidence that internal
exile, such as that practiced by the former Soviet Union, was not universally condemned.
94. See Turack, supra note 93, at 96.
95. The latter movement refers to the right to leave and to return to a country. The
Universal Declaration grants both citizens and'aliens the right to leave any country but
limits the right to return, of course, to citizens of that country. Article 12(1) and (2) of the
Political Covenant also allows both citizens and aliens the right to leave, but subjects the
right to article 12(3).
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settlers, for example financially, or encourage their movement, possibly
without any financial support. In either situation, the degree to which
settlers are informed about all aspects of their transfer, including their
destination, affects whether they are consenting thereto in an informed
manner. If uninformed, they are not voluntarily, or freely, leaving the
country. 6 The Discrimination Convention prohibits the use of racially
discriminatory measures restricting the individual's right to leave or re-
turn to his or her country. After the population transfer has taken place,
settlers who move across borders have the right to return to their home
land, should they so choose."
Population transfer within a state's recognized borders can violate
the right to internal movement. Under the Universal Declaration, the
right to free internal movement is inextricably linked to the right to
choose one's residence.9 Depending on the specifics involved, govern-
ments may violate them both by removing people from their residences
due to, or as part of, transfer across as well as within a country's
borders. 99
Although containing similar language as the Universal Declaration,
the Political Covenant is qualified by its article 12(3), which permits re-
strictions on the right to internal movement if such restrictions "are pro-
vided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (or-
dre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others. . . ." These restrictions may come into play in situations of eco-
nomic development causing massive forced removals. 100 Limits on govern-
mental abuse include article 12(3) provisions that such exceptions be
96. That poses further problems for the transferring government as well as settlers,
when the latter, facing rough conditions, choose to return to the country of origin. A govern-
ment might not have an adequate infrastructure to aid them, as equally in their return as in
their original movement. For example, settlers from the central islands .of Indonesia report-
edly have not been adequately informed of conditions in the outer, Indonesian dominated
islands. See generally Ria, Transmigrasi Bedol Desa: Indonesian Island Village Resettle-
ment from Wonogiri to Bengkulu, 26 BULL. OF INDONESIAN EcON. STUD. No. 1, 48 (April
1990); World Bank Rep. No. 5597-IND, in Indonesia Rep.-Hum. Rts. Supp. No. 10 (Aug.
1985).
97. The motivations of the sponsoring or encouraging governments, to create perma-
nent change in an occupied area, cast doubts on the existence of a meaningful right to re-
turn. See, e.g., Mansour, L'emigration des juifs sovietiques et le processus de paix israelo-
palestinien [The immigration of Soviet Jews and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process], LA
POLITIQUE ETRANGIkRE 329 (July 1990).
98. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration mentions both rights.
99. Given the absolute character of the right to free movement, people should enjoy
that same right whether or not they are classified as citizens of the state whose government
is undertaking population transfer. A possible objection is that the Discrimination Conven-
tion fails to prohibit general discrimination against aliens by states based on nationality,
citizenship, and exclusions as between citizens and non-citizens. See arts. 1, 2 & 3.
100. Cf De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Without mentioning
whether states may properly derogate from the relevant provision of the Political Covenant,
De Zayas writes that forced resettlement is "incompatible" with the freedom of movement
provisions in both the Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant.
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"necessary" and "consistent with other rights recognized in the present
Covenant," and that exceptions for ordre public require specific, factual
justifications of a compelling state interest. Regarding removals, then, one
can make a distinction-extremely preliminary, only-between such
transfers in Egypt, Paraguay and Argentina, which may have some devel-
opment rationale, and cases like East Timor and Guatemala, which seem
to feature relatively less.
Cases of internal dislocation, or removal, occur in situations of inter-
state or civil war where masses of dislocated people suffer due directly to
armed conflict. At the time of writing, in Bosnia, deals involving Serbs
and Croats were reported towards carving Bosnia into "communal protec-
torates," '' where the comparison to zonation in South Africa is vivid.
This threatened thousands of Bosnian Muslims, whose coalition had tried
to preserve a multi-religious community,. with displacement or removal
within borders. 2 The extent to which those who caused any transfer vio-
lated international law depends on a balancing of the right to internal
free movement, backed by the Protocol II'0 3-doubtfully customary
law' 04 -prohibiting dislocation related to conflict; and the Political Cove-
nant's derogations and restrictions on the right to free movement, permis-
sible for state parties signatories.
Conflicts may arise between different aspects of the right to freedom
of movement. Although part of customary international law, the rights to
leave and to return to a country are "difficult if not impossible to imple-
ment." 5 They become difficult in the context of population transfer, be-
cause they might conflict with the right to internal movement. Unless
consistent with article 12(3) of the Political Covenant, settlers entering
neighboring lands cannot force original inhabitants, against their will, to
be removed; as a logical extension, settlers cannot force original inhabi-
tants into exile.'0 6 Should original inhabitants go into exile, they must
enjoy the right to return. Furthermore, they have both the right to choose
their residence and the right to security of persons.
1 0 7
The conflict that settlement across borders poses with the right to
free internal movement takes on an added complication in cases of pro-
longed military occupation. There might be an element of conflict be-
tween humanitarian and human rights law. The Universal Declaration
101. Lean on Croatia, Too, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 14, 1992, at 8.
102. See Human Rights Watch, at 13; See also Burns, supra note 14. For treatment of
removals occurring across international frontiers, see supra text accompanying notes 12.
103. See supra Section II.D.
104. See Palley, supra note 30, at 7 (Few states have signed Protocol II).
105. Lillich, supra note 39, at 151.
106. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration states that "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
107. The right to security of persons is given more concrete meaning by the guarantees
against arbitrary arrest and detention, and against interference with one's privacy, family,




guarantees original inhabitants the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state, but article 78, paragraph 1 of
the Geneva Convention provides: "If the Occupying Power considers it
necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures con-
cerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned
residence or internment."' ° A case-by-case analysis of population trans-
fer during prolonged occupation, where an occupant transfers its own
people into the occupied territory and these people in turn obstruct the
movement of original inhabitants, may turn on an assessment of "impera-
tive reasons of security" given by the occupant.
Where such arguments fail, there is a clear connection between set-
tlements and the violation of human rights, stemming from the right to
free internal movement. Nevertheless, as in the preceding paragraph the
violation does not occur to settlers' rights, but to original inhabitants'.
The infringement is a by-product, though an important one, of transfer;
whereas in cases of isolated, massive removals the infringement on this
right may be more part and parcel of the actual population transfer be-
cause those to whom it occurs more likely are the actual transferees. At
least where gross and persistent such violations would support the perme-
ability of internationally recognized frontiers for U.N. or other attention,
this supports the above-mentioned possibility that removals as a general
rule may more easily overcome any limitations of territorial definition.
Yet case-by-case analysis may prove otherwise. In any event, further de-
velopments in human rights are important, if a broad concept of popula-
tion transfer is to move even further away from the requirement of bellig-
erency that originates from crimes against humanity and humanitarian
law.
B. Effects on Original Inhabitants
1. Effects of Population Transfer on Self-Determination
The voluntariness or consent of original inhabitants is important for
more than just freedom of movement. For example, when a transfer pol-
icy, such as settlements, is motivated by a desire to control original in-
habitants, the perspective of these people becomes relevant: did they ac-
cept to receive settlers?
Take original inhabitants to whom self-determination applies, 9 and
108. Geneva Convention, supra note 35, art. 78, para. 1.
109. The right, or principle, of self-determination in contemporary international law is
still to a large extent unclear in its precise scope and content. See generally Thurer, Self-
determination, in Encyclopedia Pub. Int'l L. Instalment 8, 470 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1975).
The author of the present article does not intend to express an opinion on such scope and
content, but rather, for purpose of discussion, assumes that self-determination applies to
original inhabitants in question. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, supra note
70, at para. 7 (self-determination pertains "to all peoples and nations, and ... a prerequi-
site of the enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms of the individual"); but see HURST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CON-
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who are also faced with population transfer. One historical example oc-
curred after World War II. The original inhabitants of Germany received
Germans removed from Poland and Czechoslovakia by these countries'
governments. De Zayas is of the opinion that these population transfers
were illegal in international law because the legitimate sovereign, the re-
ceiving state, had not consented to receive them.110
By virtue of self-determination's applicability, the original inhabi-
tants on the receiving end must have had unique identifiable characteris-
tics, including race or ethnicity, language, religion, culture, tradition and
history, which set them apart from their neighbors. Original inhabitants
may not be like Germany, a well-established sovereign; instead the self-
determination of original inhabitants may be as an ethnic minority, indig-
enous people, nation without a state, or territory under occupation. In
such an event, it is more likely that population transfer will endanger the
above special characteristics than in the instance of a sovereign state."'
Any group to which self-determination applies should have the op-
portunity to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development .. ."'' When their land
is subject to an occupying or otherwise alien power's population transfer,
original inhabitants may be stripped of the opportunity to determine
their status and to pursue their development and, thus, denied in overt
ways their access to self-determination. In the case of settlements, the
denial might occur when administrators and settlers of an occupying or
FLICTING RIGHTS 41 (1990) (Most countries either have not specifically addressed the right to
self-determination, or have done so in such general terms that nothing is added to an under-
standing of its content).
110. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 18.
111. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3; Colchester, supra note 50, at
4. Third World countries often "view themselves as unrepresented and disfavored in the
development of international law," Mose L. Floyd, Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait Sparks Migra-
tion into Jordan: A Third World Nation Copes With the Administrative Nightmare of a
Refugee Population, 5 G'TOWN IMMIG. L. J. 57, 65 (1991), and thus without as much protec-
tion from international law. Minorities, indigenous, and other "stateless" groups have
greater reason to view themselves as unrepresented, disfavored, and unprotected. Cf.
P.J.I.M. de Waart, Statehood and International Protection of Peoples in Armed Conflicts
in the 'Brave New World': Palestine as a U.N. Source of Concern, 5 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 3, 24
(Feb., 1992) (concern expressed over the U.N. protecting the right to self-determination of a
stateless group against a state's discrimination based on race, creed, or color).
112. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960), Preamble, para. 2.
See also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 71, at 121. The International Cove-
nant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter Economic Covenant], imposes the
obligation on states to "promote the realization of the right of self-determination" and to
"respect that right." Relevant to self-determination is whether people are distinct and have
a capacity for self-management and ". . . a common desire to establish an entity capable of
functioning to ensure a common future." Right to Self-Determination, supra note 70, at
para. 56. For other elements relevant to self-determination, see generally Hannum, supra
note 109, at 27-49.
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dominating power flood into the land of a distinct people, i.e. original
inhabitants, and appropriate for themselves superior positions in differ-
ent aspects of society.'
1 3
The problem becomes more acute and troublesome if alien superior-
ity resulted in subjugation, domination and exploitation of the original
inhabitants, which effects have been denounced as contrary to the U.N.
Charter and as constituting denials of fundamental human rights." 4 In
his writings about the other form of transfer, removals, at the level of
sovereign or occupied states, De Zayas has recognized the economic risks
of exploitation. He believes that in addition to being willing to receive
masses of expelled people, a state must also be economically capable of
doing so."" "In addition, the social and cultural adequacy of the receiving
state ought to be considered,""' 6 thereby referring to political domination
and social subjugation. But slow to be recognized is that these same ef-
fects may play out in cases of settlements, and that may happen even
where the unit of self-determination being affected is not an occupied
state. If the sheer scale of a population transfer causes original inhabi-
tants to become a minority in their own homeland, that dampens the pos-
sibility that they will ever realize self-determination." 7
International law's taking account of such effects will depend on res-
olution of the dilemma over how to measure respect for a country's do-
mestic jurisdiction. For the future, the key factor may be whether and
how original inhabitants in areas flooded by settlers, originating and end-
ing within U.N.-recognized borders, are recognized as being accorded and
then realizing self-determination. Developments in rights of indigenous
peoples and related land rights are also relevant,"' but these have come
113. That reasoning applies in cases of military occupation, see Eide, Human Rights in
a Pluralistic World, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN SPACE AND TIME 23, 42 (UNESCO,
1990) (those under military occupation are entitled to express self-determination), but such
a denial is also possible in cases of outside domination that do not involve military occupa-
tion. A people's right to "enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and re-
sources," provided for in articles 1 and 25 of the Economic Covenant, might be jeapordized.
That Covenant also states, in the same article referring to self-determination, "In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." Furthermore, a transferring
government might violate original inhabitants' right to an adequate standard of living, in
article 11 of the Economic Covenant, by restricting their freedom of movement. See U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3
(all above rights mentioned in conjunction with population transfer).
114. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70.
115. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 3. He adds: "The arrival of millions
of expellees in a country already incapable to feed itself necessarily leads to chaos, both for
the native population of the receiving state and for the arriving expellees" (emphasis
added). Id.
116. Id. Cf. VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY, AND DISCRIMINATION 76
(1985) (effect on political processes of mixing societies deeply divided along cultural lines).
117. See Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 105, 109 (Jan. 1976) (effects of diluting and dispersing a minority).
118. For example, as land rights relate to self-determination. For a discussion of the
relationship between self-determination, land and indigenous rights, see generally Hannum,
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slowly. In the revised text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the right to self-determination was in-
cluded in only a compromising manner." ' In what has been considered as
a bedrock convention on indigenous rights, there are provisions dealing
with removals identified in the Draft as "forcible relocation," and these
are "weak.""'2 The possibility was mentioned that there may be some im-
balance in a comparison of positive law about the two sorts of transfers
when they occur within frontiers. Depending on future developments in
indigenous rights, settlements may make up some of that differential.
Self-determination does not always imply total independence from
outside groups, but it does give those to whom it applies some control
over their own destiny.'2 ' Logically, settlements across or within interna-
tional frontiers may prevent a distinct group from determining its own
status and development particularly when the influx to them is un-
wanted. Therefore, self-determination, should it apply to original inhabi-
tants faced with population transfer, brings into play the element of con-
sent. Self-determination would thereby plug a gap that existed between
removals and settlements by virtue of the relatively greater pertinence to
removals of other concepts of consent. Shifting attention, in cases of set-
tlements, away from governmental motives for transfers and towards the
point of view of those directly affected is not inconsistent with existing
treatment of the more traditionally recognized form of transfer, removals.
For removals, it was recognized that, in addition to the motives of any
supra note 72, at 670-77. In his article A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expul-
sions, De Zayas makes the connection between land rights, respect therefore, and humane
approaches to the problem of population transfer. However, his examples, which are remov-
als and not settlements, occur across international frontiers. Nevertheless, he opines that
the gradual public sensitization to the "right of peoples to their native soil," and that "the
best and most human solution [to problems caused by population transfer] would be the
increased permeability of national frontiers." De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at
33-34. See also id. at 23; De Zayas, German Experience, supra note 23, at 5-6 ("The broad
authority of sovereign states to pursue legitimate ends [through population transfer] should
not be exercised to the detriment of a people's right to inhabit their native soil.").
119. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, Annex II. Only minor changes were introduced
for the 1991 session.
120. Hannum, supra note 72, at 72, citing to International Labour Organization Con-
vention No. 107 concerning the protection and integration of indigenous and other tribal
and semi-tribal populations in independent countries, art. 12, reprinted in 1 Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7
& Adds.1-4 (1986) (Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur), 96, 100, originally released
as E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2 Add. 1, 63, 67.
121. Van Dyke, supra note 116, at 221 ("an exercise of self-determination does not nec-
essarily mean that the choice will be for independence. One of the potential choices is for
autonomy within the framework of the state and given reasonableness on both sides this is
the choice, or compromise that will be made."); Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and
Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. No. 2, 114,
124 (1991) ("sufficient degree of autonomy within the existing state structure"); United Na-
tions Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Social and Eco-
nomic Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22 (self-
determination may only imply "self-development").
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government, the perspective of those affected-in particular, their volun-
tariness-counted also. In addition, where it can be shown that the gov-
ernmental motivations, racism and discrimination, condemned under re-
movals, exists also for governments undertaking settlements, will lend
more support for a broad concept of population transfer.
2. Effect of Population Transfer on Rights Regarding Genocide
There has been concern that people subjected to massive population
transfer, either by facing settlers or by themselves being removed, have
been threatened with genocide.' 22 For instance, in Indonesian-ruled East
Timor population transfer occurred in both forms, and, due to inhumane
conditions imposed, genocide happened concurrently.' 23 The. U.N. has
adopted the following definition of genocide, through the Genocide Con-
vention: "Genocide means any of the following acts committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such," then names several specific acts.2"
"The right of peoples to physical existence corresponds to the prohi-
bition of genocide." 12 5 In focusing, therefore, on the effects of population
transfer on the right to existence, at least two issues arise. One is the
distinction between genocide and ethnocide. The latter is a sub-category
of the former. Yet, "[tihe suppression of a culture, a language, a religion,
and so on is a phenomenon that is analytically different from the physical
extermination of a group."126 Concern over genocide in the sense of mass
death applies to relatively few cases of population transfer. The meaning
of ethnocide, which might also coincide with denial of self-determination,
is proper in situations of population transfer.2 7
122. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3; DeZayas, Forced Resettle-
ment, supra note 11, at 236 (expressed concern over genocide for removals, but not for
settlements). For some concern expressed over genocide for settlements as well as removals,
which the author of the present article cannot confirm as actual genocide, see CHITTAGONG
HILL TRACTS COMMISSION, LIFE IS NOT OURS: LAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CHITTAGONG
HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH (May, 1991); The Chittagong Hill Tracts, INTERNATIONAL WORK-
ING GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS [IWGIA] NEWSLETTER No. 1 (July/Aug., 1991); They
Are Now Burning Village After Village: Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, IWGIA
Doc. No. 51 (W. Mey ed. Dec. 1984).
123. See CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 379. See also Erlanger, supra note 26
(100,000 to 200,000 East Timorese died from 1974 to 1980); Budiardjo, supra note 46
(200,000 died); F. HIORTH, TIMOR PAST AND PRESENT 61 (1985) (in 1975, an estimated
650,000 East Timorese lived on the island).
124. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1949, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Those acts include: "(a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702.
125. Dinstein, supra note 117, at 105.
126. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 23.
127. Distinctions between ethnocide and genocide are de-emphasized by focusing on
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A second issue important to the relationship between population
transfer and the right to existence is intent. "[T]he essence of genocide is
not the actual destruction of a group-in our case, a people-but the in-
tent to destroy it as such." 2 ' This implies that if a group, for example a
"people" however defined, is destroyed, but no intent to destroy existed,
then no genocide occurred. Conversely, one individual murder would ful-
fill this definition of genocide if the act was designed to further the ex-
tinction of a people.
The situation of the Kurds after the Second Gulf War involved popu-
lation transfer in the form of massive removal.' 9 Payam Akhavan be-
lieves the requisite intent existed, stating that "it was not in question
that the deliberate policy of the Iraqi authorities had resulted in condi-
tions which were so extreme as to cause the mass exodus of Kurds to
neighboring States." ' Given that the receiving end was "inhospitable re-
gions where their survival may be threatened," Akhavan recommends
that the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion on
whether this constitutes " 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part' within
the meaning of the Genocide Convention. '1 31 A positive response would
mean genocide occurred, and could not be overlooked by those who cite
to Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.1 3' Depending on such a judgement,
removals could cause genocide.
Depending upon circumstances, the governmental intent required to
raise an act to genocidal level may vary. For example, a high degree of
centralized authority and quasi-bureaucratic organization in the govern-
ment, like that of Iraq, has not always been required. According to Chalk
and Jonassohn, an exception has been "when the victim group is numeri-
cally small." They give as an example the phenomenon of population
existence rather than extermination, a constructive, preventative approach to the subject.
Some causes are common to both forms, one of which is discrimination. For example, pre-
vention of discrimination would remove religious intolerance, described by a U.N. Sub-Com-
mission study as "one of the decisive causes of genocide." The Genocide Study, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub. 2/416, cited in WARWICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1983).
128. N. ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTIONs, as quoted in Dinstein, supra note 117,
at 105.
129. Some of the international discussion of post-second Gulf War Kurdistan was in
terms of refugees rather than forced transfer. See, e.g., Security Council Resolution 688,
supra note 5.
130. Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention Through the Advisory
Opinion Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. No. 8/9, 297
(1991).
131. Id. at 297-98.
132. Akhavan states that "given its status as a 'crime against humanity,' an inference
that genocide exists would definitely put into question the proposition that the matter is
one 'essentially within the jurisdiction' of Iraq." Id. at 298. See also Leslie Gelb, The




transfer, "such as the indigenous tribes wiped out by colonizing set-
tlers."' 3 Settlements would be a possible cause of genocide. One need
think no further than the Indonesian presence in East Timor.
In summary about genocide: governmental participation in popula-
tion transfer might take the form of force, as in the case of some remov-
als. Or it might take the form of encouragement or sponsorship, as in the
example of some settlements. Although containing less obvious intent, the
latter involvement needs to be examined even further through concerted
case study for the extent to which it may raise the results on those af-
fected by the movement to the level of genocide. Like voluntariness or
consent, and freedom of movement arguments, legal reasoning regarding
genocide is more obvious to cases of removal, but may apply also to set-
tlements. Relatively blind to issues of the permeability of frontiers, while
not requiring a state of belligerency, the concept of genocide is crucial to
any broad concept of population transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law on genocide, like self-determination, refers to groups rather
than individuals. Any development of the consciousness of international
law towards collectiveness is important to a wholistic legal approach to-
wards uprooted people.134 Given the varying constraints along the lines of
belligerency and territorial definitions, as well as other differences be-
tween removals and settlements mentioned above, international law is
distant from treating removals and settlements as one category per se. A
broad treatment should be pursued, however, especially where the moti-
vations and effects of both types may be egregious. Some of what were
called variances or differences may be just noise, coming from the law on
population transfer being undeveloped and, thus, somewhat confusing.
The coherent legal study of population transfer will gain speed as the
realization grows that it is "inaccurate to use the passive voice to describe
much of the world's population flows.'
3
1
133. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 28.
134. Should a wide concept of population transfer take hold, a legal regime that relies
on rights, especially those of groups, will avoid confusing legal categories. As shown by the
cumbersome distinction between pre-and post- Second Gulf War movements of Kurds, it
might be difficult to divide refugee flow as a more individual phenomenon from any accept-
able, broad definition of massive population transfer. Cf. Palley, supra note 30, at 3 n.2.
135. Weiner, supra note 6, at 7.
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